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Introduction 
The criminalisation of protest is a growing and worrying trend across 
the world. While in North America and Western Europe this trend has 
been researched extensively, the research capacity in England and 
Wales appears much smaller.  
To address this, this seminar and roundtable discussion brought 
together some of the key UK-based experts on protest, direct action, 
repression, policing and law. 
Invited speakers presented work-in-progress reports on public order 
policing and covert surveillance, trials and sentencing, court decisions 
and legislative changes.  
A few of the contributions have been collected in this report. 
Details 
This event was made possible by the generous support of the Centre 
for Spatial, Environmental and Cultural Politics (SECP) at the University 
of Brighton and an Innovation Fund Grant by the British Society of 
Criminology. It took place at the Falmer campus of the University of 
Brighton on Friday 01 March 2019. 
The organisers would like to thank everyone who helped with the 
organisation and all participants who shared their experiences and 
expertise on the day. 
Raphael Schlembach 
Deanna Dadusc 
Roxana Cavalcanti 
Francesca Kilpatrick 
 
Brighton, 15 March 2019 
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Escaping the paradigm of privacy:  
state surveillance and the ‘chilling effect’ 
on protest 
 
It is sometimes asserted that state surveillance has the ability to ‘chill’ 
political protest, yet it is rarely clear what a ‘chilling effect’ means, or 
how it relates to individual rights.   On those occasions where the 
courts have acknowledged the ‘chilling effect’ of surveillance, such an 
effect is typically associated with individual privacy, and in particular a 
loss of information autonomy resulting from the retention by the state 
of personal data relating to political activity.   There is, however, an 
increasing body of research that suggests that the ‘chilling effect’ is 
not exclusively a matter of privacy, but rather that state surveillance 
has the capacity to disrupt and impede the ability of protest groups to 
make protest happen.    
The collective capacity of social movements to mobilise (i.e. to create 
the conditions for protest to take place) may be constrained – or 
‘chilled’ - by surveillance activity in at least three ways.   Firstly, it may 
alter protester perceptions of the opportunities available to them by 
creating the impression of a hostile or intolerant policing 
environment.  This dampens commitment and enthusiasm, induces a 
highly restrictive level of self-policing, and curtails the impetus for 
creativity and innovation within social movements.  Secondly, 
surveillance may be disruptive to organisational activities, by 
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distracting attention from other matters, or by constraining the way in 
which people participate.  Thirdly, surveillance may limit internal and 
external communication by social movement groups, by stigmatising 
actors (individually or collectively) and creating conditions 
unconducive to the building of social networks.   
Data obtained from interviews with social movement actors illustrates 
some of the ways that these disruptive impacts arise.  One activist, for 
example, reported that the scale and pervasiveness of police 
surveillance capabilities damaged her belief in the utility of protest. 
She stated that her belief in the utility of protest was eroded by ‘the 
fact they’ll go to those lengths, they will throw so many resources at 
things’.   Another said that when organisational meetings were subject 
to visible surveillance people would ‘suddenly shrink, and be less 
confident and they wouldn’t participate’.  And a third spoke of how 
surveillance disrupted solidarity and communication because ‘you’ve 
been marked out…[as] the dodgy people’.   
Generally however, the courts have been reluctant to recognise that a 
‘chill’ of protest activity arising from surveillance will also amount to 
an interference with protest rights, in particular the right to freedom 
of assembly and association.   Instead the courts have dealt with 
surveillance issues almost exclusively through the framework of 
privacy.  In the context of public protest, where there is deemed to be 
no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in relation to being watched or 
photographed by state actors, a reliance on this framework is 
problematic.  It provides no redress for those whose individual or 
collective autonomy is limited, and no obligation on state actors to 
demonstrate surveillance acts are justified and proportionate.   If the 
right to engage in expressive assemblies is to be properly protected, 
there is a need to unpack with greater clarity what we mean by the 
‘chill’ of state surveillance, and explore the relationship of the ‘chilling 
effect’ with the restriction of Article 11 rights.  
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Divide and Rule: 
The Resistible Rise of Europe’s Far-Right  
 
When Bertolt Brecht (1) parodied the Nazis by comparing them to US 
gangsters organising violent crime, he stressed the potential for 
resistance to bring them down.  Their victory in the 1930s was not 
inevitable: A movement united against fascism could have swept them 
off the streets and out of power.  This only underlines the importance 
of understanding the rise of contemporary racism and authoritarian 
leaders.  The style of government characterised as ruling through 
division has become increasingly common in the 21st century in Europe 
and America, as explained by the discourse analysis of Ruth Wodak: 
Currently, we observe a normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, 
racist and anti-semitic rhetoric, which primarily works with ‘fear’: 
fear of change, of globalization, of loss of welfare, of climate 
change, of changing gender roles; in principle, almost everything 
can be constructed as a threat to ‘Us’, an imagined homogenous 
people inside a well-protected territory’ (2) 
For example, in recent years there has been an increasing emphasis in 
Britain and the US in combatting so-called radicalisation through 
surveillance, labelling and repression.  But even though governments 
believe they have a democratic mandate so to do, through their 
pledge to the public to fight the ‘war on terror’, the results of these 
actions can be problematic and often achieve the reverse of their 
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intended goal of suppression.  When Muslim youth in the UK, for 
example, feel subject to a panoptican-style level of observation (3) 
online where teachers and lecturers are encouraged to surveil their IT 
use, referring concerns on to agencies directly linked to the security 
services, MI5 and MI6, as well as the police.  These processes of 
investigation threaten punishment, they demand and manufacture 
consent derived from the fear of persecution.  But they also reinforce 
the labelling of this group as ‘dangerous’, mirroring the Islamophobic 
stigmatising discourse already surrounding them and risking their 
becoming so alienated that the radicalisation threat becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  This paper will apply some of the ideas to the 
evolving political climate in Europe, where much concern has been 
voiced over the growth of another form of radicalisation – populism, 
on the right and left.   
  
(1) Brecht, Bertolt (1941) The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui (German: Der 
aufhaltsame Aufstieg des Arturo Ui) 
(2) Wodak, Ruth (2015) The Politics of Fear London: Sage x 
(3)  Refers to Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison where all the cells are visible 
to a central control point i.e. stimulating self-control through fear of surveillance. 
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Hoffmann’s Bargain 
In February 2006, the House of Lords heard an appeal by twenty 
activists who had been convicted and conditionally discharged for 
various offences of aggravated trespass or criminal damage at 
Marchwood military port facility and RAF Fairford in February and 
March 2003, immediately prior to the start of the US/UK invasion of 
Iraq (Jones, [2006] UKHL 16). The appellants argued that their 
convictions were unsound, on the basis that the invasion of Iraq was 
illegal under international law (a ‘crime of aggression’ under Article 5 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), thereby 
meaning that: (i) they had a lawful excuse (under s1 of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971); (ii) they used reasonable force (under s3 of the 
Criminal Law Act 1967); and (iii) their actions were justified under the 
common law defence of necessity (or duress of circumstances). The 
Lords dismissed the appeal, finding the public international law crime 
of aggression not to be a crime under domestic law, and thus s3 of the 
1967 Act could not apply. 
Hoffmann LJ, in his judgment, examined ‘the limits of self-help’ (§70-
94) in the context of s3 of the 1967 Act (the use of ‘reasonable force’), 
both for offences against property as well as against the person. 
Hoffmann argued that the initial convictions would have been sound 
even if aggression had been a crime in domestic law (§88), as in a 
democratic state, ‘the citizen is not entitled to take the law into his 
own hands’ (§84). Nonetheless, he also stated, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steven Cammiss, 
University of 
Leicester  
 
Brian Doherty,  
Keele University  
 
Graeme Hayes,  
Aston University 
 
  
 
9 
 
civil disobedience on conscientious grounds has a long and 
honourable history in this country. People who break the law 
to affirm their belief in the injustice of a law or government 
action are sometimes vindicated by history. The suffragettes 
are an example which comes immediately to mind. It is the 
mark of a civilised community that it can accommodate 
protests and demonstrations of this kind. But there are 
conventions  which are generally accepted by the law-
breakers on one side and the law-enforcers on the other. The 
protesters behave with a sense of proportion and do not 
cause excessive damage or inconvenience. And they vouch 
the sincerity of their beliefs by accepting the penalties 
imposed by the law. The police and prosecutors, on the other 
hand, behave with restraint and the magistrates impose 
sentences which take the conscientious motives of the 
protesters into account. (§89) 
Accordingly, Hoffmann sets out the attendant ‘practical 
implications […] for the conduct of the trials of direct action 
protesters’, such that the acts in question 
must be considered in the context of a functioning state in 
which legal disputes can be peacefully submitted to the 
courts and disputes over what should be law or government 
policy can be submitted to the arbitrament of the 
democratic process. In such circumstances, the 
apprehension, however honest or reasonable, of acts which 
are thought to be unlawful or contrary to the public interest, 
cannot justify the commission of criminal acts and the issue 
of justification should be withdrawn from the jury. Evidence 
to support the opinions of the protesters as to the legality of 
the acts in question is irrelevant and inadmissible, disclosure 
going to this issue should not be ordered and the services of 
international lawyers are not required. (§94) 
Hoffman’s opinion creates a set of conventions, and a normative 
framework, for understanding a what he implies is a British tradition 
of toleration, guiding how the criminal justice system should 
respond to the conscientious and non-violent, but ostensibly illegal, 
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actions committed by social movement activists. We call this 
framework Hoffmann’s bargain. 
Our research speaks to four key questions surrounding the nature and 
implications of this bargain. We currently focus in particular on the 
trial of the Stansted 15, who were charged with and convicted at 
Chelmsford Crown Court in late 2018 of an offence of the intentional 
disruption of services at an aerodrome contrary to section 1(2)(b) of 
the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, for their participation in 
a peaceful but disruptive direct action, in which they blocked the 
loading and departure of a Home Office charter deportation flight at 
Stansted airport on 28 March 2017. AMSA 1990 was designed to 
implement into domestic law the 1988 ‘Montreal Protocol’ regulating 
international terrorism, passed by Parliament in the wake of the 
Lockerbie bombing. We observed this trial throughout its ten-and-a-
half-week span, and interviewed a number of the defendants both 
prior to and after the trial.  
Our key areas of exploration are: 
1. Hoffmann’s bargain as an ‘invented tradition’: the extent to 
which Hoffmann’s bargain (i) accurately represents the charging 
and sentencing of social movement activists in the criminal 
justice system prior to Jones (this is an empirical question to be 
investigated); and (ii) functions ideologically to reinforce claims 
to the fairness of decision-making in the criminal process, located 
in a conservative narrative of national identity. 
2. Hoffmann’s bargain is presented as a guarantee of restraint (and 
thus as a compact favouring leniency in the charging and 
sentencing of activists for their commission of unlawful acts, 
based on their co-optation within the liberal democratic 
tradition). Under its terms, non-violence will result in a non-
custodial sentence. Yet there is an alternative reading of the 
bargain: rather than a guarantee of leniency, it acts as a guide to 
conviction, thus ignoring other potentially available, and more 
radical traditions, including jury nullification. Under its terms, 
there is no route to acquittal for ‘self-help’; if Hoffmann’s bargain 
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reduces the likelihood that non-violent activists are imprisoned, 
it also ensures that they are convicted. 
3. Recent trends in charging and sentencing suggest that 
Hoffmann’s bargain is breaking down. These trends include the 
initial willingness of the District Judge in the Heathrow 13 case to 
impose prison sentences (check that is the case….we have the 
judgement) ; the charging of the Frack Free Four with a public 
nuisance offence, their conviction and initial sentencing to 
substantial prison terms, and the rejection of Hoffmann’s Bargain 
by the Court of Appeal when allowing their appeal against 
sentence (Roberts, Blevins and Loizou [2018] EWCA Crim 2739); 
and the charging of the Stansted 15 under terrorism-related 
offences, as outlined above. 
4. The judge’s sentencing remarks in the Stansted trial indicate that 
the non-custodial sentences handed down to the activists (three 
were given suspended prison sentences of nine months, and all 
were given community service orders) nonetheless remain within 
Hoffmann’s framework: the judge argued that the offence was 
serious and passed the threshold for a custodial term, but that 
the defendants’ conduct and motives reduced their culpability. 
Yet Hoffmann’s bargain is notable not just for what it enables and 
entails (conditions of arrest, charging (although the charges, in 
this case, were in breach of the bargain), and sentencing) but for 
what it excludes within the trial process, such as the use and 
definition of necessity (although the trial judge did withdraw 
necessity from the jury only after the close of the defence case, 
allowing the defence to advance their claims), appropriate 
disclosure practices, the judge’s conduct of the trial, and the use 
of a route to verdict (which, in effect, closes down options for the 
jury, such as nullification, by providing the jury stepped questions 
that frame and shape their verdict in accordance with the law). 
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Academia and the policing of protest:  
a call for radical reorientations 
The police are upholding the law. They are not upholding the 
Government. This is not a dispute between miners and 
government. This is a dispute between miners and miners ... It is 
the police who are in charge of upholding the law ... (they) have 
been wonderful. 
 
These comments by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
were made during a BBC interview aired on 9 April 1984, just over a 
month into the year-long coal dispute in Britain. As we approach the 
thirty-five year anniversary of the start of the miners’ strike, this 
statement is difficult to reconcile with what is now known about the 
degree of government interference in the policing of the dispute 
(Milne 2014; Fine and Millar 1985).  
The policing of the miners’ strike shattered the myth that Britain has a 
uniquely benevolent police force. Yet, claims that the police act as 
neutral arbiters in social conflict has retained remarkable traction 
within official police discourses. This portrayal of police officers as 
‘citizens in uniform’, accountable to the community rather than 
government, has been central to attempts to secure public legitimacy 
in policing since the inception of the modern police (Reiner 2010). 
Periodic crises in policing have been followed by attempts to (re-
secure public legitimacy, usually in the form of legislative and policy 
reforms to restrain police discretion and enhance police 
accountability.  
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It is within this context that recent reforms in public order policing 
should be located. Triggered by the renewed crisis of legitimacy in 
public order policing in the aftermath of the G20 protests in 2009, a 
number of reforms ostensibly aimed at making public order policing 
more ‘human rights compliant’ have been welcomed by a growing 
body of academic writers in the area. Protest policing is said to be 
entering what Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC 
2011) has described as a “new era”, grounded on consent, mutual 
collaboration and an overarching respect for protesters’ human rights.  
My research on the policing of anti-war (Gilmore 2010), anti-fascist 
(Gilmore 2013) and anti-fracking protest (Gilmore et al 2017; Jackson 
et al 2018) offers a critique of the growing academic consensus on 
public order policing in the wake of the HMIC report. I argue that in 
contrast to the presumed consensual approach underpinning the 
official response and reflected in much of the academic literature, the 
relationship between the police and protesters is based upon grossly 
unequal power. The disparity has intensified in recent years with a 
significant expansion of state control over public protest, including a 
proliferation of public order offences, an expansion of pre-emptive 
public order regulatory powers, the use of private law remedies as a 
proxy for criminalisation and an expansion of the state’s intelligence 
and security apparatus to monitor political movements.  
During a period in which ‘police partnership research’ has become 
entrenched within universities, I argue for a radical reorientation in 
public order policing research from the ‘velvet glove’ to the ‘iron fist’. 
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(Re)defining legitimate forms of political 
expression in the UK  
 
The recent high profile cases of Rich Loizou, Simon Blevins and Richard 
Roberts – imprisoned for their involvement in anti-fracking protests in 
Lancashire – and the Stanstead 15, have highlighted the 
criminalisation of non-violent protest in the UK. While the release of 
Loizou, Blevins and Roberts following appeal, and the non-custodial 
sentences handed to the Stanstead 15, have been welcomed, the 
evidence suggests that the criminalisation of dissent in the UK 
continues apace.  
Based on research into the policing of anti-fracking protests in 
England, our work has sought to highlight the role of the police in this 
process. We have documented experiences of violent policing and the 
repression of anti-fracking protests by police and in doing so, we have 
challenged the idea of a wholesale transformation in the policing of 
protests in recent years (Gilmore, Jackson and Monk 2016). But we 
have also highlighted how police in the UK have sought to (re)define 
what is, and is not, legitimate political action. This intervention by 
police, evident in both policy and practice, has had significant impact 
on campaigns against fracking, but arguably has wider implications for 
all forms of popular protest and political activism.  
As we have discussed elsewhere (Jackson, Gilmore and Monk 2018), 
recent official documents have demonstrated how police define the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of protest. The 
ability, and willingness, of police to define categories including 
‘demonstrator’, ‘protester’, ‘activist’ and ‘extremist’, reveals a great 
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deal about the political choices being made by police in their response 
to different forms of popular protest.  
Crucially, the divide between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour 
drawn by police does not rest on a distinction between violent and 
non-violent protest, but is instead based on the target and goal of 
protest. In relation to anti-fracking protest, the basic opposition to 
onshore oil and gas extraction, combined with a commitment to 
disruption, through peaceful, non-violent, direct action protest, has 
been sufficient for the movement to be categorised as extremist 
(Netpol 2018a).  
We are observing a narrowing of the parameters within which 
acceptable protest is defined, and it is significant that it is police, 
through developments in national policy and local operational 
policing, who are the drivers of this redefinition. The category of 
“domestic extremist” for example, has been developed to capture 
forms of political activism that are seen to pose a threat to the status 
quo, and, as Baroness Jenny Jones (2018) has noted, “it is police, 
rather than the Home Office or parliament who decide how to 
categorise campaigners as “domestic extremists””.  
The discretion afforded to police to define legitimate protest has 
enabled them to categorise direct action as criminal and to reinforce 
a view of acceptable protest as that which goes no further than a 
symbolic register of opposition. In the last two years, these 
parameters have been further narrowed through a series of legal 
injunctions taken out by the fracking industry on the advice of police 
(Netpol 2018). These injunctions have been even more prescriptive in 
setting out what protesters can and cannot do and have significant 
implications for all forms of direct action protest (Brock et al 2018). 
The mobilisation of the law to limit the capacity of protest is not new, 
but the way that the law has been used to reinforce the police vision 
of acceptable political action has significant implications. 
The history of undercover policing demonstrates that the police in the 
UK have been willing to make political decisions in the targeting of 
dissenting groups (Bunyan 1976; Evans and Lewis 2013; Woodman 
2018), but the continued drive by police to (re)define acceptable 
political activism in recent years is significant. The choices made, and 
the targets identified, further expose the politics of policing and draw 
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our attention to the autonomy police enjoy at local and national levels 
to shape, and intensify, the criminalisation of dissent. 
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The #spycops inquiry  
 
The public inquiry into undercover policing, set up by Theresa May, 
opened in July 2015 (Schlembach 2016). It was supposed to run for no 
more than three years. Now, in early 2019, we have been told to wait 
for another year before the first evidence will be heard. It is now not 
expected to report back until 2023 at the earliest. 
I have been following the matters with which the inquiry is concerned 
for over eight years. In 2011, an acquaintance I knew as Mark Stone 
was exposed as a former undercover police officer. His real name was 
Mark Kennedy and he had acted as a ‘covert human intelligence 
source’ for a secretive political policing unit run by what was then the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (Schlembach 2018). 
I had met Mark, and two other undercover officers, at climate change 
protests and on many social occasions over a number of years. 
Although I am certain that I was not their target, they pretended to be 
committed activists as well as friends, partners and fellow travellers of 
the network of environmentalists they had infiltrated. On at least one 
occasion, a ‘covert human intelligence source’ (Marco Jacobs) acted as 
an agent provocateur to set me up for a protest-related arrest. It 
allowed police to search my house and confiscate, as ‘evidence’, 
materials for the PhD that I was working on. 
The public inquiry into undercover policing appears to show little 
interest in such information gathering of a ‘routine nature’ (Transcript, 
Privacy hearing – 31/01/19, p. 211) - in the words of inquiry chairman 
Sir John Mitting – although he admitted that the monitoring and 
disrupting of protest groups was so widespread that ‘the task of 
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investigating 50 years of undercover policing is formidable’ 
(Transcript, Privacy hearing – 31/01/19, p. 27). 
There is little we know for certain, but estimates have it that over 
1,000 political organisations were reported on in the 1968-2011 
period and 5,000 individuals could be identified from intelligence 
reports made by a Metropolitan Police unit in a ten year period alone 
(Transcript, Privacy hearing – 31/01/19, p. 57). 
The targets of undercover deployments were numerous. Amongst the 
first was the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. During the 1970s and 80s, 
there were long-term deployments in the Socialist Workers Party and 
other socialist groups. They also included animal rights groups, 
environmental protesters and some far right groups.  
For campaigners, a focus of the inquiry should be on institutional 
racism, given that police have admitted to collecting information on a 
number of black family justice campaigns. 
They have also accused police of institutional sexism, referring the 
common practice of undercover officers having sexual and intimate 
relationships with women in the target groups. A ‘tradecraft manual’ 
that was disclosed last year advised officers to have ‘fleeting, 
disastrous relationships with individuals’, but several of them lasted 
for years before officers disappeared when their deployments were 
ended. 
Frequently, those with personal stakes in the matters of the inquiry 
direct their frustration at the highly contested figure of the inquiry 
chair. The distrust was summed up by Helen Steel, a prominent non-
police core participant in the inquiry: 
If you can't see the mental distress and the fear that this process 
will cause to those who have already been spied on, and the risk of 
causing additional trauma and psychological harm to those 
already abused, then I am afraid to say you are lacking in empathy 
and it is not appropriate for you to be presiding over this Inquiry 
(Transcript, Privacy hearing – 31/01/19, p. 121). 
The Inquiry has cost more than £10million already, with little to show 
for other than the alienation of many core participants. 
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Open letter from UK academics: The harsh 
sentencing of anti-fracking campaigners 
sets a dangerous precedent  
 
17 October 2018 
 
The co-initiators of this open letter are very happy about the court of 
appeal's decision to overturn the excessive sentencing of Simon 
Blevins, Richard Roberts and Richard Loizou. In the last few weeks, 
people across the UK, including over 1,500 signers of this open letter, 
have spoken out in shock and disbelief. Most importantly, the anti-
fracking movement showed that it was not intimidated by the ruling, 
with people continuing to take action, not least on Monday, when 
Cuadrilla started its fracking operations in Lancashire and activists 
blockaded their site for 12 hours. We need more, not less, direct action 
to challenge the government's support of the fracking industry. Even 
though today's result is a victory, we must be not be complacent. We 
must be vigilant and continue to resist the suppression of resistance 
and the criminalisation of protest in the UK. 
 
From The Guardian: Court quashes fracking protesters' 'excessive' jail 
sentences http://bit.ly/2P3K0OX 
This letter was originally titled 'Open letter from University of Sussex 
academics: The harsh sentencing of anti-fracking campaigners sets a 
dangerous precedent'. Although signers from other organisations 
have always been welcome, given the overwhelming support, we have 
officially opened it up to academics from across the country (and 
international allies) who wish to express their concern] 
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We the undersigned are writing to express our growing concern about 
the shrinking space for communities and environmental defenders to 
engage in civil opposition to fracking developments in the UK. 
This week three non-violent campaigners opposing fracking were 
jailed for 15 to 16 months simply for ‘causing a public nuisance’ and 
for not expressing regret. Although others have received jail sentences 
in more recent times, this is the first time since 1932 that 
environmental defenders have been imprisoned for such long periods 
of time for staging a protest in the UK. It is also the first time ever that 
activists have been jailed for anti-fracking actions. 
With fracking companies increasingly granted civil injunctions to 
prevent protest, the scope of protest is becoming more and more 
restricted, representing a threat to fundamental rights to freedom of 
expression and assembly. 
Fracking is controversial in the UK. According to government surveys 
conducted in 2017, only 16% of people support fracking development. 
Given the grave environmental consequences of hydraulic fracturing 
and growing concerns about climate change, this is not surprising. 
The ruling sets a worrying precedent, curtailing opportunities for the 
kind of public protests that have historically been effective in 
instituting the legal and policy changes that defend our environment 
for our future generations. We need more, not less, space for action 
to confront unsustainable industrial practices that harm our 
communities and perpetuate our reliance on fossil fuels. 
We oppose this absurdly harsh sentence and join calls for an inquiry 
into the declining space for civil society protest that it represents. 
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The repression of activism in Italy: 
criminalising ‘moral support’ and ‘social 
dangerousness’  
  
From the Genoa G8 in 2001 to the Hamburg G20 in 2017, from 
anarchists to migrants’ solidarity groups, there has been a worrying 
European trend in the criminalisation of local and international 
networks of activists. These forms of criminalisation went far beyond 
traditional forms of policing of protest and arrests of protesters. While 
the repression and control of protest have increasingly become 
militarised, the scope of criminalisation reached further than the 
‘protest event’ in itself. All over Europe, we are witnessing widening 
international police co-operations for arrests, investigations, profiling 
and prevention of travel of activism, often associated with the closing 
of international borders before large demonstrations. Moreover, 
networks of activists are increasingly being criminalised by the use of 
‘organised crime’ laws and anti-terrorism measures, which have the 
effect of widening the scope of criminalisation, from protest events 
and individual protesters to entire networks of activists.  
In Italy, this is done through the use of legal tactics that remove the 
need of evidence for the criminalisation of activism, thereby 
suspending key principles of due process. The vague concepts of 
‘moral support’ and of ‘threat to social disorder’, together with the 
aggravating circumstances of ‘criminal association’ are increasingly 
being used as a strategy to extend the scope of criminalisation to an 
aleatory potential dangerousness of activism, thereby allowing the use 
of ‘Special Surveillance Measures’ that preventively restrict people’s 
freedom of movement and association. The following provides a 
summary of the key milestones of these forms of criminalisation.  
Devastation and Plunder: criminalising ‘moral support’   
In the aftermath of the anti-G8 protests in Genoa, in July 2001, 
activists were charged with ‘Devastation and Plunder’: this law was 
created in 1935, during the Italian fascist regime, and it addressed 
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extreme forms of ‘social dangerousness’ to the constituted order: at 
the time, a fascist order. In 2011, ten years after the protests took 
place, 10 activists were condemned to a total of 100 years of prison 
under this law. The re-adaptation of this old law was particularly 
problematic due to its capacity to incriminate the ‘moral support’ to 
Devastation and Plunder. This way, activists are not put on trial for 
their alleged behaviors during the protest: just the fact that they were 
present at the protest, in a context where ‘devastation and plunder’ 
supposedly occurred, was enough to consider them guilty for the 
events, due to their alleged moral support for the events. While more 
than 200,000 people converged during those days, pictures of two of 
protesters on a moppet in different locations where ‘things were 
happening’ was enough to consider them responsible for everything 
that happened during those three days of urban guerrillas.  
Similarly, after a large demonstration in Rome that took place on 
October 15th 2011, Davide Rosci, Mauro Gentile and Cristian 
Quatraccioni were convicted to 6 years in prison because a police car 
was set on fire. The protest brought together 5,000 people but, again, 
the only evidence for conviction of the three protesters was a picture 
of them standing next to the vehicle on fire, and laughing. The public 
campaign that followed, under the slogan ‘Many of us were laughing’ 
(A ridere eravamo in tanti) highlighted the novelty of these legal 
tactics that criminalise one’s presence to a collective protest, remove 
the necessity of material evidence, and deliver exemplary 
punishments by imprisoning individuals as representative of an entire 
movement.   
Both in this case, and in the case of the 1st of May 2015 –No Expo 
demonstration in Milan, where both Italian and Greek anarchists were 
convicted for ‘Devastation and Plunder’, activists were not arrested 
during the protests, but after a long investigation by the DIGOS 
(Special Operations Division) that led to their identification through 
footage and video materials.  All charges were increased by 
aggravating circumstances of ‘criminal association’: the collective 
nature of the protests, and the either material or ideological 
involvement of individual activists to broader struggles, was 
considered as a key element in defining their participation to so called 
‘social disorder’. Therefore, not just actions and behaviors, but the 
ideological inclinations of activists, as well as their alleged ‘social 
dangerousness’ were put on trial. The latter, defined as their capacity 
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to contribute to social disorder, is arbitrarily based on evaluations of 
their surroundings, social networks, occupation and overall lifestyle.  
Special Surveillance Measures: containing ‘social dangerousness’  
The trend continues with the recent application of ‘special surveillance 
measures’ for containing the alleged ‘social dangerousness’ of 
activists. ‘Special surveillance measures’, usually reserved for cases of 
organised crime and terrorism, entail the revocation of suspects’ 
passports and driving licences, as well as evening curfews and the 
prohibition to meet more than three people at once. Special 
Surveillance measures (L. n. 1423/1956) are a heritage of fascist 
preventive tactics, which are not based on the evaluation and 
judgment of behaviors enacted in the past, but of their probability to 
happen in the future. 
In January 2019, three years of ‘Special Surveillance’ were enforced on 
5 activists due to their participation to the YPG struggle in Rojava. 
Again, activists were not arrested due on evidences of their actions, 
but on suspicions based on their political and ideological inclinations, 
their social networks as well as their overall lifestyle.  The activists 
‘moral support’ to what the Italian State defines a terrorist 
organisation (paradoxically dismissing YPG’s attempts to fight against 
ISIS) is equated to participating in terrorist activities.  
Similar surveillance measures and definitions of social dangerousness 
were also applied to No-Tav activists in Val di Susa, where the 
accusation of ‘moral support’ and ‘criminal association’ keep on 
justifying arrests and convictions.  In the aftermath of large 
demonstrations that took place between June 27th and July 3rd 2011, 
38 activists were sentenced to a total of 140 years of imprisonment, 
each one receiving between 6 months and 4 and half years. Although 
they were eventually acquitted, four other activists, suspect of 
damaging to property during an act of sabotage of the construction of 
the High-Speed train line, were accused of terrorist activities: their 
‘terrorism’ defined as ‘damaging the image of Italy’.  
A European Trend? 
The Italian case is not isolated and seems to constitute the forefront 
of European trends. In Spain, in 2015, the so-called Operación Piñata 
in association with Operations Pandora and Pandora II mobilised three 
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years of investigations that led to 14 house raids and the arrest of 33 
anarchists with the attempt to prove the existence of “coordinated 
anarchist groups with terrorist ends” which “subvert public order and 
seriously disrupt the social peace.” as well as and the offence of 
“criminal organisation” (Article 570bis of the Criminal Code). So called 
‘Coordinated Anarchist Groups’ (GAC), were accused of the 
“promotion and the coordination of sabotage”, mostly for distributing 
anarchist fliers and zines, including an essay titled ‘Contra la 
democracia”, as well as the use of encrypted communication systems 
defined as ‘extreme security measures’. The public prosecutor openly 
stated that rather than investigating criminal acts, the priority was 
“investigating the organization, and the threat they might pose in the 
future”. After weeks of pre-trial detention, most anarchists were 
released on conditional bail under judicial supervision (passport 
confiscation, ban on leaving the territory, and to sign-on every 15 
days).  
While these are just few examples, and more research on the rest of 
Europe is needed, there is a clear pattern that requires new forms of 
resistance to these forms of criminalisation: a resistance that needs to 
reach beyond the walls of the court-rooms and beyond the legal 
defence of individual cases, and that instead formulates collective 
strategies to counter criminalisation at a local and international level.  
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The criminalization of dissenting 
communities in Brazil          
 
Brazilian informal urban settlements or favelas have a long history of 
resisting colonial, political, economic and racial oppression (Zaluar and 
Alvito, 2006). Their resistance cannot be narrowly defined as single or 
episodic. Instead, their multiple forms of community resistance are 
embedded into daily life, language, song, dance, and ways of living, 
self-construction of housing and subverting patron-client relations for 
example. Their resistance is best thought of as ‘weapons of the weak’ 
(Scott, 1985). Yet, their struggle for social justice, access to health, 
education, housing, living wages and political voice has become more 
politicised and criminalised than the forms of resistance Scott 
described.  
Brazil has a long history of criminalising the activities of its poorest and 
most diverse communities. Samba – one of the nation’s most 
prominent musical forms, which emerged in the favelas and has been 
used by black communities to criticize and dissent white privilege – 
used to be criminalised. New popular styles of music in the favelas 
such as Brazilian funk are also criminalised through coercive policing 
and control of the baile funk (outdoor funk parties). The same story is 
familiar with the past criminalisation of capoeira, a sport, dance and 
martial art, which emerged as a form of resistance to slavery in Brazil’s 
colonial period. The very word ‘marginal’ in Brazilian Portuguese is 
used to conflate people who are socially and economically 
marginalised with criminality (Perlman, 2010). The word ‘marginal’ in 
Brazil is largely used as an insult, it is understood as the same as 
‘criminal’. 
After the most recent re-democratization period in Brazil (1985 
onwards), there was hope that social movements and leftist activists 
had gained voice, pushed away the military and authoritarian 
governments out of politics. The left gained some space in mainstream 
politics. The Pink tide in the 2000s, that is, the period of left-wing 
politics in Latin America, was a time of hope for Brazil’s subaltern and 
often criminalised communities. 
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In the 2000s, and in the run-up to mega events such as the World Cup 
and Olympics in Brazil (2014 and 2016), a number of ‘public security’ 
projects emerged throughout the country allegedly aiming to curb 
Brazil’s high rates of homicide. Such projects often assumed the 
narrow view that crime and violence reside exclusively in favelas or in 
the dissenting communities I described above. This is seen in the 
wording of the titles of these programmes of securitization and in the 
application of ‘hot-spot’ policing in poor communities. For example, 
the program known as ‘Police pacification Units’ in Rio de Janeiro 
assumed that the poor needed to be ‘pacified’. The programme ‘Pact 
for Life’ in Pernambuco is another illustration of the securitization and 
criminalisation of dissenting communities process, where my previous 
research revealed the criminalisation of the use of public space by 
poor black people (Cavalcanti, 2017a, Cavalcanti, 2017b). 
Despite the democratization of the country, transgressing social and 
spatial boundaries is increasingly risky in Brazil’s highly unequal 
society.  The workers’ party allowed a stew of punitive neoliberal 
politics in the penal sphere, permitting the growth of mass 
incarceration, making political coalitions with the political right, while 
also investing in education, health and welfare (Azevedo and Cifali, 
2015). The result was explosive. The left speedily lost its support 
during Brazil’s most recent economic down turn (2013-date). Right 
wing politicians had already re-gained majority in congress and were 
ready to use Brazil’s conservative media to associate the left with 
corruption, and use the politicization of the judiciary in its favour to 
oust the worker’s party. 
The end of the Workers’ Party government was characterised by a 
number of street protests, which ranged from student movements 
against rising bus fares to right-wing, middle-class and elite protests 
for the ousting of president Dilma. Now, Brazil’s dissenting 
communities face even larger challenges with the rise of far-right 
president Bolsonaro to the presidency. Little is know at this stage 
about how much of Bolsonaro’s rhetoric will turn into policy and 
practice. But what he has said in public is highly concerning. His 
comments – celebrating torture; announcing that Brazil’s most recent 
military dictatorship (1964-1985) should have shot to kill more 
adversaries; telling a congresswoman she was too ugly to merit rape; 
declaring that he would prefer his son to be killed in a car crash than 
gay; declaring he would deregulate protections over the Amazon 
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rainforest; and promising his followers he would rid the land of the 
socialist left – are especially concerning for subaltern groups and 
criminalised communities. They remind us of the need to reorganize 
and continue the struggle for social justice. 
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